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feat: always bind to 0.0.0.0

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Reachability is controlled by the host firewall / compose port
publishing, not the bind address. Backend, compose, and docs all
now default to 0.0.0.0 so the API is reachable from the frontend
container, the host, and the LAN without per-env overrides.

Files:
- backend/src/cyclone/__main__.py: default host = 0.0.0.0
- docker-compose.yml: refresh the comment to match the new posture
- CLAUDE.md / README.md / docs/ARCHITECTURE.md / docs/REQUIREMENTS.md:
  reframe the bind note accordingly
This commit is contained in:
tyler
2026-06-24 17:40:18 -06:00
parent 1860782ad6
commit edca04868d
6 changed files with 20 additions and 17 deletions
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docs/ARCHITECTURE.md
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@@ -678,7 +678,7 @@ Returns `status="ok"` only when every subsystem is healthy. `status="degraded"`
The default deployment. Two terminals:
```bash
# Terminal 1 — backend on 127.0.0.1:8000
# Terminal 1 — backend on 0.0.0.0:8000 (always binds to all interfaces; firewall is what restricts reachability)
cd backend
.venv/bin/python -m cyclone serve
docs/REQUIREMENTS.md
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@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ Each requirement is `FR-NN`, traceable to one or more sub-projects. Verification
| ID | NFR | Source / SP |
|---|---|---|
| NFR-1 | **Local-only bind + auth.** Backend binds `127.0.0.1:8000` (overridable via `CYCLONE_PORT`); CORS allowlist is exact (`http://localhost:5173`); login required (bcrypt + HttpOnly session cookie; first admin bootstrapped from env vars `CYCLONE_ADMIN_USERNAME` + `CYCLONE_ADMIN_PASSWORD`); dev/test escape hatch via `CYCLONE_AUTH_DISABLED=1` (logs WARNING at boot). | SP1 + auth (2026-06-23 merge) + SP24 (doc reconciliation) |
| NFR-1 | **Always bind 0.0.0.0 + auth.** Backend binds `0.0.0.0:8000` (overridable via `CYCLONE_HOST` / `CYCLONE_PORT`); CORS allowlist is exact (`http://localhost:5173`); login required (bcrypt + HttpOnly session cookie; first admin bootstrapped from env vars `CYCLONE_ADMIN_USERNAME` + `CYCLONE_ADMIN_PASSWORD`); dev/test escape hatch via `CYCLONE_AUTH_DISABLED=1` (logs WARNING at boot). Reachability is controlled by the host firewall / compose port publishing, not the bind address. | SP1 + auth (2026-06-23 merge) + SP24 (doc reconciliation) |
| NFR-2 | **Determinism.** Parser / serializer round-trip is guaranteed on 113 real prodfiles (`docs/prodfiles/claims/*.x12`); canonical fields, not byte-identity (called out in the SP8 spec). | SP8 |
| NFR-3 | **Audit completeness.** Every reconciliation anomaly, every state transition, every 999/277CA reject writes an `ActivityEvent` (in `activity_events` table, un-chained; powers the `/activity` feed and inbox state transitions). | SP2 + SP10 |
| NFR-4 | **Tamper-evidence.** A separate `audit_log` table (SP11) carries SHA-256 hash-chained rows for security-sensitive events (login attempts, rejections, key rotations, backup lifecycle, rejected requests). `GET /api/admin/audit-log/verify` detects any break. **The `activity_events` (NFR-3) and `audit_log` (NFR-4) tables are distinct** — different semantics, different audiences. New code that needs an audit row must decide which one to write to. | SP11 |