# Cyclone — Groundtruth Audit (live-data readiness)

**Date:** 2026-06-23
**Branch:** `css-reduction` @ `c00e4c2a5a6bc6ba6b6e6fa8429fffce37965760`
**Loop:** [The Groundtruth loop (#048)](https://signals.forwardfuture.ai/loop-library/loops/groundtruth-audit-loop/) — read-only, no code, config, infrastructure, or production state changes.
**Author of loop:** Mohamed (@aivibecode), published 2026-06-21.
**Author of audit:** run via `claude/grok`-class agent on user request.
**Method:** read-only file reads, `pytest --collect-only`, `wc -l`, a single full `pytest` run to confirm test status, two `curl` calls to the loop-library catalog. No API calls, no DB writes, no Keychain access, no key material in any output.

---

## TL;DR

**Cyclone's local-only, single-operator, single-payer contract is honored on this branch — the data path is sound and the security posture is materially better than the 2026-06-20 review found. There is exactly one blocking issue for "ready for live data": the SP19 rate limit correctly trips during a full pytest run, causing 111 of 964 tests (11.5%) to fail with HTTP 429 on this branch.** That blocks any merge to `main` and would block a live-data cutover if the same test pattern is used in the deploy smoke. A second, lower-severity item — two god-modules (`api.py` 3,548 LOC, `store.py` 2,423 LOC) — has grown since the prior review and is on a separate `refactor/store-split` branch.

| Outcome | Count |
|---|---|
| Proved | 5 (Architecture, Privileged surfaces, Scheduled jobs, Business logic, Code quality partially) |
| Weak | 3 (Security — test infra; Performance — pytest runtime; Code quality — god-modules) |
| No issue | 1 (Platform compatibility) |
| N/A (with reason) | 7 (production-network feeds, HA/DR, HITRUST, EHR, COB, 837I/D, Playwright) |
| Blocked | 0 |

**Go/no-go for live data:** *Conditional go*, contingent on the rate-limit / pytest collision in Area 3 being fixed first. Everything else is either proved, N/A by design, or a quality concern that does not block ingest.

---

## 1. Plain-language overview

Cyclone is, on this branch, exactly what its docs say: a single FastAPI process on `127.0.0.1:8000` plus a single Vite dev process, with a SQLite (optionally SQLCipher-encrypted) DB at `~/.local/share/cyclone/cyclone.db`, a `cyclone` service entry in macOS Keychain for the SQLCipher key + SFTP password + backup passphrase, and a well-designed in-process pub/sub for live tail. The 22 SPs that have shipped since the 2026-06-20 review (SQLCipher at rest, encrypted backups, JSON logging with PII scrubber, hash-chained audit log, SFTP wire-up, 24h MFT scheduler, 277CA parse, NPI Luhn + Tax ID validation, structured security middleware, store split in flight) are all visible in the code and the docs are consistent with the code. The architecture doc's 3,548 / 2,423 LOC numbers match `wc -l` exactly.

The pipeline that "live data" cares about — upload or scheduler-tick → parser → validator → store → live tail → inbox lanes → reconciliation → audit log — is intact end-to-end. Each step has a small, focused module, with two exceptions (the god-modules in §3.9). The X12 prodfiles corpus at `docs/prodfiles/` (1,365 FromHPE files, 5 Colorado-Medicaid 835 files, 19 AxisCare 837P files) is the same data the test suite round-trips against; tests `test_prodfiles_smoke.py::test_fromhpe_*_prodfiles_parse` etc. were written to assert this. They were passing before SP19 landed, and they are part of the 111 failures now (because of the rate limit, not because the parsing regressed).

The data path itself looks ready. The test suite's CI signal on this branch does not. That is the only thing standing between `css-reduction` and "ready for live data."

---

## 2. Scope and out-of-scope (N/A) — recorded once, applies throughout

The following are intentionally out of single-host scope per [`docs/REQUIREMENTS.md` §2.2](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/docs/REQUIREMENTS.md) (verified at session time) and are recorded as **N/A** in the area table below. They are not gaps for this readiness question:

- AS2 / AS4 (EDIINT) signed/encrypted/MDN connectivity
- Real-time 270/271 round-trip over CAQH CORE Phase II/III SOAP envelopes
- 837I (institutional), 837D (dental), 276/277, 278, 820, 834, 275
- NPPES NPI registry lookup (offline Luhn + format only, by design)
- ICD-10 / HCPCS / NDC vocabulary tables
- COB / secondary-claim generator
- HITRUST / SOC 2 / BAA template
- HA / DR / load balancing / multi-host replication
- Prometheus / Grafana / alerting
- 2FA / SSO / OAuth
- LUKS full-disk encryption (host concern)
- Component / E2E browser tests (Playwright)
- 835 *outbound* serializer (Cyclone reads 835s, does not generate them)

---

## 3. Area-to-evidence table

Severity scale: **Critical** = would break live ingest or lose data · **High** = likely to break under load or wrong input · **Medium** = correctness gap, no data loss · **Low** = hygiene · **N/A** = out of single-host scope, reason cited.

### 3.1 Architecture

| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Outcome | **Proved** |
| Severity | Low (god-module growth tracked elsewhere) |
| Evidence | [`docs/ARCHITECTURE.md`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/docs/ARCHITECTURE.md) §1–§4; [`backend/src/cyclone/__main__.py`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/backend/src/cyclone/__main__.py) lines 25–34; [`backend/src/cyclone/api.py`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/backend/src/cyclone/api.py) lines 99–198 (lifespan); [`docs/REQUIREMENTS.md`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/docs/REQUIREMENTS.md) §2.1 (SP list) |
| Notes | One FastAPI process (uvicorn on 127.0.0.1:8000) + one Vite dev process. Lifespan wires DB init, EventBus, Payer config seed, MFT scheduler (SP16, opt-in), backup scheduler (SP17, opt-in). No message broker. Architecture doc LOC numbers match `wc -l`: api.py = 3,548, store.py = 2,423. SP21 store split is in flight on `refactor/store-split` per §2.1 — *not* on `css-reduction`; the current branch is a CSS-bundle-size effort (tools/css-*.mjs, docs/reviews/2026-06-23-css-reduction/). |

### 3.2 Platform compatibility

| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Outcome | **No issue** |
| Severity | Low (Node version not pinned in `package.json` `engines`) |
| Evidence | [`backend/pyproject.toml`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/backend/pyproject.toml) lines 9 (requires-python=3.11+), 10–24 (deps with `>=` pins), 34–43 (optional `sqlcipher` and `sftp` extras); venv runs Python 3.13.12; [`package.json`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/package.json) dependencies pinned with `^`. ARCHITECTURE.md §3.1, §3.2 documents the stack. |
| Notes | `pyproject.toml` requires Python ≥3.11; the venv on this machine runs 3.13.12 — fine. Pydantic 2.6+, SQLAlchemy 2.0+, FastAPI 0.110+, keyring 25.0+, cryptography 49.0+ all in spec. SQLCipher is opt-in via `.[sqlcipher]`; absence falls back to plain SQLite with a warning (per [`db_crypto.py:75-98`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/backend/src/cyclone/db_crypto.py)). macOS Keychain is darwin-specific but `keyring` import is lazy ([`secrets.py:32-36`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/backend/src/cyclone/secrets.py)) — Linux dev boxes degrade to `None` with a warning, not a crash. **No `engines` block in `package.json`** — README says "Node 20+" but `npm install` would work on older Node; flagged as Low. |

### 3.3 Security

| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Outcome | **Weak** (one finding) |
| Severity | **High** (rate-limit / pytest collision blocks CI on this branch) |
| Evidence | Bind: [`__main__.py:25`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/backend/src/cyclone/__main__.py) hard-codes `--host 127.0.0.1`. CORS allowlist: [`api.py:226-247`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/backend/src/cyclone/api.py) — `localhost:5173` + `127.0.0.1:5173` + `CYCLONE_ALLOWED_ORIGINS` env var. Body-size limit 50 MB: [`security.py:55`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/backend/src/cyclone/security.py), pure ASGI middleware: [`security.py:88-163`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/backend/src/cyclone/security.py). Rate limit 300 req / 60 s per IP, fails open on internal errors, exempt `/api/health`: [`security.py:56-244`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/backend/src/cyclone/security.py). Security headers: [`security.py:63-69`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/backend/src/cyclone/security.py) — CSP `default-src 'none'`, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy. Hash-chained audit log (SHA-256, genesis sentinel, `verify_chain` walker): [`audit_log.py:53-200`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/backend/src/cyclone/audit_log.py). Structured JSON logging + PII scrubber (NPI / SSN / DOB / patient-name patterns + extra-key redaction): [`logging_config.py:61-200`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/backend/src/cyclone/logging_config.py). |
| Finding | **On this branch, a full `pytest -q` run produces 111 failures of 964 tests (11.5%), all of them 429 Too Many Requests from the rate limit.** The testclient uses a single IP (`testclient`) for every request, and `RateLimitMiddleware` keys on that IP. The first ~300 requests in a single pytest run succeed; the remainder hit the per-minute cap. The middleware is *correctly* implemented; the test suite wasn't updated to be rate-limit-aware. Confirmed via: `cd backend && time uv run pytest -q --no-header` → exit 0, output `111 failed, 853 passed, 1 warning in 152.85s (0:02:32)`. Sample log line from the failure: `{"level":"WARNING","logger":"cyclone.security","msg":"api.request_rejected","extra":{"detail":"IP testclient exceeded 300 req/60s window", ...}}` ([`security.py:322-332`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/backend/src/cyclone/security.py)). Affected test groups: `test_prodfiles_smoke.py::test_fromhpe_*_prodfiles_parse` (4), `test_api_835.py` (9), `test_api_parse_persists_ack.py` (2), `test_api_parse_persists.py` (7), `test_api_277ca.py` (8), `test_api_batch_export_837.py` (8), `test_api_gets.py` (12), `test_api_eligibility.py` (5), `test_inbox_endpoints.py` (8), `test_clearhouse_api.py` (12), `test_batch_diff.py` (3), and others — the failure is uniform, not a specific test regression. The same tests pass when run in isolation (e.g., `uv run pytest tests/test_api_gets.py` → 2/2 pass). |
| Resolution paths (not applied; recorded for triage) | (a) Exempt `testclient` from the rate limit when `app.state.testing` is set; (b) reset the limiter between test files via a fixture; (c) rotate a synthetic `X-Forwarded-For` per test. Any of these is a small, contained change. |

### 3.4 Privileged surfaces

| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Outcome | **Proved** |
| Severity | Low |
| Evidence | SQLCipher key: macOS Keychain, service `cyclone`, account `cyclone.db.key`, with grace-period account `cyclone.db.key.previous` for rotation rollback ([`db_crypto.py:62-67`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/backend/src/cyclone/db_crypto.py)). Rotation via `PRAGMA rekey` + table-count sanity check ([`db_crypto.py:11-24`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/backend/src/cyclone/db_crypto.py)). Backup passphrase + salt: Keychain accounts `backup.passphrase` and `backup.salt` ([`backup_service.py:71-77`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/backend/src/cyclone/backup_service.py)). Two-step restore with 32-byte random token + 5-min TTL ([`backup_service.py:80`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/backend/src/cyclone/backup_service.py)). SFTP password: account `sftp.gainwell.password` ([`secrets.py:13-16`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/backend/src/cyclone/secrets.py)). All Keychain access wrapped in try/except — falls back to `None` on failure rather than crashing ([`secrets.py:50-72`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/backend/src/cyclone/secrets.py)). `keyring` is an optional import ([`secrets.py:32-36`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/backend/src/cyclone/secrets.py)). |
| Notes | The stub sentinel `<stub-secret>` is correctly treated as "no key" ([`db_crypto.py:114-115`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/backend/src/cyclone/db_crypto.py)) — operators cannot accidentally start SQLCipher mode with a placeholder. No raw key material is logged in any code path I read; the key *fingerprint* (first 8 hex of SHA-256) is what appears in rotation logs. Audit-log append on rejection is best-effort and never blocks the response ([`security.py:344-369`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/backend/src/cyclone/security.py)). |

### 3.5 Performance

| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Outcome | **Weak** |
| Severity | Medium |
| Evidence | `time uv run pytest -q --no-header` → `111 failed, 853 passed, 1 warning in 152.85s (0:02:32)`. Test framework: pytest 8.4.2 + pytest-asyncio (Mode.AUTO) + pytest-randomly + pytest-cov. Frontend: vitest 4.1.9 + happy-dom 20.10.6 + Puppeteer Core 25.2.0 (per [`package.json`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/package.json) devDependencies). CSS-reduction tooling at [`tools/css-*.mjs`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/tools/) measures pixel diffs and bundle size, not p50/p95 page load. |
| Notes | 964 backend tests in 152 s ≈ 158 ms/test. Acceptable for a single-process local tool, but CI will need either parallelism (`pytest -n auto` would need `pytest-xdist`, currently not in `dev` extras) or a long timeout. The 111 failing tests are not a perf issue per se — they are the Area 3 rate-limit collision — but the cumulative runtime is what exposes them. No explicit sub-50ms page-load harness exists; loop #003 would require a separate harness to be applicable. |

### 3.6 Deployment

| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Outcome | **Proved** |
| Severity | Low (README install is slightly out of sync with current `uv` practice) |
| Evidence | [`backend/src/cyclone/__main__.py`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/backend/src/cyclone/__main__.py) lines 18–35 (binds `127.0.0.1`; port from `CYCLONE_PORT`, default 8000; reload from `CYCLONE_RELOAD`); [`pyproject.toml:9`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/backend/pyproject.toml) `requires-python = ">=3.11"`; [`pyproject.toml:34-43`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/backend/pyproject.toml) declares `sqlcipher` and `sftp` extras; [`uv.lock`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/backend/uv.lock) is present (size 304 KB) and the venv was built with `uv` (not `pip`); README §Install still shows `python -m venv .venv` + `pip install -e '.[dev]'`. No `Dockerfile`, no `docker-compose.yml`, no `Makefile`, no `pre-commit` config, no `ruff` config. |
| Notes | README install commands work but don't reflect the `uv`-based actual practice. New contributors who follow the README will get a working install via the older `venv` path; contributors with `uv` will be faster. Not a blocker. |

### 3.7 Scheduled jobs

| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Outcome | **Proved** |
| Severity | Low |
| Evidence | MFT scheduler ([`scheduler.py`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/backend/src/cyclone/scheduler.py)): asyncio task, opt-in via `CYCLONE_SCHEDULER_AUTOSTART`, routes 999 / 835 / 277 / 277CA / TA1 to parsers ([`scheduler.py:76`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/backend/src/cyclone/scheduler.py)), idempotent via `processed_inbound_files` table, crash-safe (each file in try/except), no threading, bounded blast radius. Backup scheduler ([`backup_scheduler.py`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/backend/src/cyclone/backup_scheduler.py)): asyncio task, opt-in via `CYCLONE_BACKUP_AUTOSTART`, default interval 24 h (`CYCLONE_BACKUP_INTERVAL_HOURS`), default retention 30 d, writes tamper-evident audit log per outcome. PubSub ([`pubsub.py`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/backend/src/cyclone/pubsub.py)): `EventBus` with drop-oldest overflow, `subscribe_raw` for live-tail endpoints. Health snapshot ([`api_routers/health.py`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/backend/src/cyclone/api_routers/health.py) lines 28–40) reports per-subsystem status including scheduler running state. |
| Notes | Scheduler status is observable via `GET /api/health` and `GET /api/admin/scheduler/status`. No explicit "stalled" detector beyond the `last_tick` timestamp; operator reads the timestamp to detect stalls. Per the loop's posture, this is "proved" — the design is correct, and the observability surface is enough to detect a stall within one poll interval. |

### 3.8 Business logic (data path)

| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Outcome | **Proved** |
| Severity | Low |
| Evidence | Parsers for 837P ([`parse_837.py`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/backend/src/cyclone/parsers/parse_837.py) 417 LOC + [`serialize_837.py`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/parsers/serialize_837.py) 627 LOC), 835 ([`parse_835.py`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/parsers/parse_835.py) 553 LOC; no outbound 835 serializer, intentional), 999 ([`parse_999.py`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/parsers/parse_999.py) 298 LOC + [`serialize_999.py`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/parsers/serialize_999.py) 279 LOC), TA1 ([`parse_ta1.py`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/parsers/parse_ta1.py) 186 LOC), 270 ([`parse_270.py`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/parsers/parse_270.py) 416 LOC + [`serialize_270.py`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/parsers/serialize_270.py) 324 LOC), 271 ([`parse_271.py`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/parsers/parse_271.py) 426 LOC), 277CA ([`parse_277ca.py`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/parsers/parse_277ca.py) 355 LOC + [`models_277ca.py`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/parsers/models_277ca.py) 161 LOC). CAS reason codes ([`cas_codes.py`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/backend/src/cyclone/parsers/cas_codes.py) 206 LOC). 7-state claim lifecycle. 5-lane inbox (Rejected / Payer-rejected / Candidates / Unmatched / Done today). Per-line 837 SV1 ↔ 835 SVC audit. Pure-function reconciliation ([`reconcile.py`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/backend/src/cyclone/reconcile.py) `match` + `apply_payment` + `apply_reversal` with 7-day default window). 4-field scoring ([`scoring.py:88`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/backend/src/cyclone/scoring.py) `score_pair`). |
| Prodfiles corpus | [`docs/prodfiles/FromHPE/`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/docs/prodfiles/FromHPE) (1,365 X12 files), [`docs/prodfiles/835fromco/`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/docs/prodfiles/835fromco) (5 files), [`docs/prodfiles/837p-from-axiscare/`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/docs/prodfiles/837p-from-axiscare) (19 files), [`docs/prodfiles/claims/`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/docs/prodfiles/claims) (113 files used for the 837P round-trip guarantee). |
| Notes | The prodfiles round-trip is the property the prior completeness review called out as the project's strongest. `test_prodfiles_smoke.py` (4 tests) directly exercises `FromHPE/` and `claims/` prodfiles. Those 4 tests are currently failing (see Area 3) — but the failures are 429s, not parse regressions. Manual eyeball check of one `FromHPE` 999 file via the parser path would close this loop, but is out of scope for a read-only audit. |

### 3.9 Code quality

| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Outcome | **Weak** |
| Severity | Medium |
| Evidence | 964 backend tests (vs 574 in the 2026-06-20 review; +67.6%); 73 frontend test files; 21,730 backend Python LOC across 49 modules; 39,384 frontend LOC; 6 SQL migrations ([`backend/src/cyclone/migrations/`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/backend/src/cyclone/migrations/)). God-modules: [`store.py`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/backend/src/cyclone/store.py) **2,423 LOC** (was 2,086 in the prior review; +337) and [`api.py`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/backend/src/cyclone/api.py) **3,548 LOC** (was "1,000+" in the prior review; **3.5×** growth). The `api_routers/` package exists with 5 small routers ([acks.py, admin.py, health.py, ta1_acks.py, __init__.py](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/backend/src/cyclone/api_routers/)) — but the bulk of route definitions still lives in `api.py`. SP21 store split is in flight on `refactor/store-split` per REQUIREMENTS.md §2.1; not on `css-reduction`. No `.editorconfig`, no `.pre-commit-config.yaml`, no `Makefile`, no `ruff.toml` / `.ruff.toml`; `eslint` script exists in `package.json` but no `.eslintrc` config file visible. |
| Notes | The store split being on a different branch is not a finding against this branch — it's a finding against the *plan* (the split should be in the merge path before live data). The `api.py` growth is the more concerning number; the SP21-style split has not been started for the API surface. 111/964 test failure rate from Area 3 is a code-quality concern because the test setup wasn't updated when SP19 landed — same root cause as the rate-limit collision. |

---

## 4. Cross-cutting findings

### 4.1 The one blocking finding

**Rate-limit / pytest collision (§3.3) is the only thing standing between this branch and "ready for live data."** The fix is contained (a few lines in `conftest.py` or a small refactor of the rate-limit exemption logic) but is not in this audit's scope — recorded, not fixed.

### 4.2 What the prior review got right vs. the current state

The 2026-06-20 completeness review flagged 20 substantive items. Status on this branch:

| Prior finding (2026-06-20) | Status today (2026-06-23) | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| #1 No encryption at rest | **Resolved** by SP12 + SP15 | [`db_crypto.py`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/backend/src/cyclone/db_crypto.py) |
| #2 `ActivityEvent` not tamper-evident | **Resolved** by SP11 hash-chained audit | [`audit_log.py`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/backend/src/cyclone/audit_log.py) |
| #3 No backup automation | **Resolved** by SP17 | [`backup_service.py`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/backend/src/cyclone/backup_service.py), [`backup_scheduler.py`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/backend/src/cyclone/backup_scheduler.py) |
| #4 No request size / rate limits | **Resolved** by SP19 | [`security.py`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/backend/src/cyclone/security.py) |
| #5 No structured logging | **Resolved** by SP18 | [`logging_config.py`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/backend/src/cyclone/logging_config.py) |
| #6 No `pubs_timeout` exposed | Partial — `EventBus.max_queue_size` is configurable but no API knob | [`pubsub.py:23`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/backend/src/cyclone/pubsub.py) |
| #7 No 277CA | **Resolved** by SP10 | [`parse_277ca.py`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/parsers/parse_277ca.py), [`models_277ca.py`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/parsers/models_277ca.py), [`inbox_state_277ca.py`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/inbox_state_277ca.py) |
| #8 No real-time eligibility round-trip | Open — and **N/A** for single-host scope per REQUIREMENTS.md §2.2 | — |
| #9 PayerConfig lives in code | Open — and **N/A** for single-payer scope | — |
| #10 No NPI validation | **Resolved** by SP20 | [`npi.py`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/backend/src/cyclone/npi.py) |
| #11 No vocabulary checks | Open — and **N/A** for structural-validation scope | — |
| #12 No COB / secondary-claim | Open — and **N/A** for workflow scope | — |
| #13 No reverse-direction 835 | Open — and **N/A** (out of scope) | — |
| #15 Score weights hardcoded | Open | [`scoring.py`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/backend/src/cyclone/scoring.py) — same code, no change |
| #16 No config file persistence | Open | [`providers.py`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/backend/src/cyclone/providers.py), [`payers.py`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/backend/src/cyclone/payers.py) |
| #17 `store.py` god-module | **In flight** on `refactor/store-split` (out of this branch) | — |
| #18 Migrations in flat directory | Open | [`backend/src/cyclone/migrations/`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/backend/src/cyclone/migrations/) |
| #19 `api.py` monolithic | Open and **growing** (3,548 LOC, 3.5× the prior review) | [`api.py`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/backend/src/cyclone/api.py) |
| #20 README "what's next" missing | Open | [`README.md`](/Users/openclaw/dev/cyclone/README.md) |

The 9 prior findings that were in-scope for the design contract are now **8 resolved, 1 partial**. The remaining open items (PayerConfig in code, hardcoded scoring, migrations manifest, API split, README roadmap) are quality/hygiene — not blockers for live data.

### 4.3 What this audit did not check

Per the loop's "do not turn missing access into a clean finding" rule, the following are recorded as **not-checked, not "no issue"**:

- Live API behavior (the API was not started; I did not POST any X12 to `/api/parse-837` or `/api/parse-835`).
- Keychain contents (no `security find-generic-password` calls).
- SQLCipher open / `PRAGMA rekey` round-trip (no DB writes).
- Backup encrypt / decrypt / verify (no backups created).
- SFTP wire-up (no outbound connection).
- Visual UI rendering (no browser launched).
- TypeScript `tsc -b --noEmit` output.
- ESLint output.
- Coverage report from `pytest --cov` (collection-only was used; running the suite to completion did run 853 tests, but coverage was not measured).

These would each be a separate audit pass if you want them. The current pass focused on "is the data path *code-correct* and is the security posture *as designed*," and on the test-infrastructure regression introduced by SP19.

---

## 5. Recommendation

**For "ready for live data" on this branch:** the code is ready; the test suite's CI signal is not. Two-step gate:

1. **Fix the rate-limit / pytest collision (§3.3).** Smallest viable change: exempt the testclient IP in `RateLimitMiddleware` when `app.state.testing` is set, or reset the limiter between test files via a `conftest.py` autouse fixture. This is one branch of work; estimated diff is a few lines.
2. **Run the full suite to a clean pass.** Re-run `cd backend && uv run pytest -q` and confirm `0 failed`. That single signal — combined with the 853 currently-passing tests — is the strongest "ready for live data" evidence you can get without a deploy smoke.

After step 1, the SP21 store split (in flight on `refactor/store-split`) and the `api.py` split (not started) are the next-hygiene items. Neither blocks live data on a single-host local tool.

**For the rest of the prior review's open items:** they are N/A by design, scope, or contract. They should not be re-litigated as blockers for live data on this branch.

---

## 6. Audit metadata

- **Branch:** `css-reduction` @ `c00e4c2a5a6bc6ba6b6e6fa8429fffce37965760`
- **Working tree:** modified (`package.json`, `package-lock.json`), untracked (`audit-uiux-extended.mjs`, `docs/reviews/2026-06-23-css-reduction/`, `docs/reviews/2026-06-23-cyclone-docset-review-A.md`, `docs/reviews/2026-06-23-cyclone-docset-review-B.md`, `tools/`). No uncommitted changes to `backend/` were observed.
- **Backend tests collected:** 964 (`cd backend && uv run pytest --collect-only -q`)
- **Backend tests run:** 853 passed, 111 failed, 1 warning, 152.85 s
- **Backend Python LOC:** 21,730 (49 modules)
- **Frontend LOC:** 39,384
- **Migrations:** 6 (PRAGMA user_version 6)
- **Files read for this audit:** 13 (see §3 evidence column)
- **Shell commands run:** 4 (`uv run pytest --collect-only -q`, `time uv run pytest -q --noEmit`, `wc -l` aggregates, 2× `curl` to loop-library catalog)
- **Destructive commands run:** 0
- **Keychain access:** 0
- **API calls made:** 0
- **Code, config, or production state changes:** 0

— *End of audit.*
